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Collective Bargaining
Public Sector:

•In

the

Carroll County Education Association, Inc.
v. Board of Education of Carroll County
by Luke Mickum

aryland's state and local governments provide many services
to Maryland citizens. The
quantity and quality of these services
depends in no small part on the salaries
and working conditions state and local
employers must provide to the labor
force that performs these services.
Although state and local government
employees are unionized, they do not
enjoy all of the benefits and advantages
of unionization enjoyed by their private
sector counterparts. In private business,
negotiations between employers and
unions typically take place behind
closed doors; whereas, in the public
sector, citizens feel that they ought to
have the right to attend labor negotiations that affect the quantity and
quality of public services.
Prior to the recent decision of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Carroll County Education Association,
Inc. v. Board of Education of Carroll
County, 1 Maryland law gave no clear
answer to the question whether a
government employer, such as the
Board of Education of Carroll County
(Board), had the right, in its own
discretion, to open labor negotiations
with its employee unions to the public,
or whether the Board had to bargain
with the union on the issue of whether
to hold open meetings. Carroll County
placed the issue squarely before the
court when the Carroll County Teacher's
Association (Association) sought a
declaratory judgment against the Board
declaring that the Board's unilateral
resolution to open labor negotiations to
the public was void.
The lower court granted the Board's
motion for summary judgment and
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held that the Board had no legal duty to
bargain with its union on the issue of
open meetings. On appeal, the court of
appeals affirmed this decision and
based its holding primarily on Maryland's Open Meeting Act (OMA),2
which generally requires that all meetings of public bodies be open to the
public. "Collective bargaining," the
term applied to labor negotiations
between employers and employee
unions is an exception to the OMA
open meeting requirement. According
to § II(a)(8) of the OMA, collective
bargaining sessions with public sector
unions "may" be closed to the public. 3
Nevertheless, the appellate court found
that the discretion to close labor
negotiations to the public lay solely
with the public employer.
This article examines the distinctions
between public and private sector labor
relations and the impact that Carroll
County may have on public sector labor
relations.

Statutes Construed
The conflicting statutes that formed
the basis of the Carroll County opinion
were the OMA and the Public Employee's Labor Relations Act (PERLA).4
The Board argued that the OMA gave it
the right to open meetings in their sole
discretion. The Association argued that
allowing the Board to hold open
meetings without first discussing the
matter with the union constituted a
failure to bargain in "good faith," a
violation of § 6-408 of PERLA, which
states that upon request by the employee union, a public school employer
must confer in good faith at all

reasonable times with the employee
organization. 5
In deciding the issue in favor of the
Board, the court held that the Board's
unilateral decision to hold open meetings did not violate the PERLA good
faith requirement, which only requires
that a public employer come to the bargaining table with an open mind, prepared to negotiate. The court also based
its holding on § 15 of the OMA, which
states that in the event of "any conflict
between this subtitle and other provisions of law relating to meetings of public bodies this subtitle shall apply. "6
The court resolved the conflict between
the OMA and PERLA in favor of open
meetings.

Open Meetings vs. Collective
Bargaining
In Carroll County, the court of appeals recognized the differences between public and private sector labor
negotiations. One major difference is
that, in the pri vate sector, market forces
greatly influence collective bargaining.
On the other hand, in the public sector,
legislative and political forces influence
collective bargaining and add noneconomic considerations to the bargaining process.
A second fundamental distinction
between public and private sector labor
relations is that strikes in the public sector are generally prohibited? because
public services (such as police protection), unlike most private sector services
and products, are indispensable. Moreover, public sector strikes threaten state
sovereignty. 8
A third distinction is the difference

in the legal status of agreements be~
tween employers and their unions in
the public and private sectors. Labor
agreements negotiated in the private
sector are legally binding upon execu~
tion by the parties. In the public sector,
however, all final decisions are left to
the public employer,9 and agreements
are always subject to renegotiation in
the event the legislature fails to allocate
sufficient funds to finance the agree~
ment.lO Thus, it may be unrealistic to
compare public sector collective bar~
gaining with collective bargaining in the
private sector.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
approached Carroll County mindful of
these distinctions and recognized that
its decision would impair the public
sector collective bargaining mechanism.
In allowing open bargaining sessions,
the court understood that it was weak~
ening the union's bargaining position:
at open meetings, public opinion ordi~
narily favors management because union
demands, such as higher salaries, usually
result in reductions in public services
or higher taxes. Therefore, citizens
attending open meetings often pressure
unions to temper their demands.
In reaching its decision, the court ex~
amined statistics suggesting that open
meetings inhibit discussion and the free
interplay of ideas that take place at
closed meetings. The court's decision to
permit open meetings, in the face of
these statistics, indicates that the court
gave greater weight to the benefits ac~
cruing to the public through open meet~
ings than to the potential impairment of
the public sector collective bargaining
process.

Effect on Maryland Law
Despite the many differences be~
tween public and private sector labor
negotiations, the Association in Carroll
County argued that the court should
apply the same standards to the public
sector that it would apply in a private
sector labor case, in keeping with Mary~
land's tradition to follow private sector
precedents in public sector labor
cases'! I The court was not persuaded
and allowed the Board the discretion to
insist on open meetings as a prerequi~
site to further negotiations or reaching a
final agreement.
In the private sector, insistence on a
topic of negotiation that does not in~
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volve wages, hours or working condi~
tions is strictly prohibited. 12 Thus, by
allowing the Board to insist on open
meetings (a topic not dealing with
wages, hours or working conditions),
the Carroll County decision marks a
clear break with the tradition of follow~
ing private sector precedents in public
sector cases.
This aspect of the case should be
restricted to its facts, however. In Carroll
County, a statutory basis existed for al~
lowing the Board to insist on a subject
not involving wages, hours or working
conditions. In cases where statutory
justification does not exist, courts
should apply private sector precedents
to public sector labor law cases and al~
low as close an adherence to true collec~
tive bargaining as is feasible in the pub~
lie sector.

Impact on Collective Bargaining
The general purpose of collective
bargaining is to encourage a harmon~
ious relationship between management
and employees, as it is generally recog~
nized that "refusals to confer and nego~
tiate had been one of the most prolific
causes of industrial strife."13 Therefore,
collective bargaining should be encour~
aged whenever possible.
Despite its sound basis, the rationale
of Carroll County has been criticized by
the majority of courts, commentators
and labor boards that have addressed
the issue. The general view is that open
labor negotiations in the public sector
damage the collective bargaining
mechanism established by legislatures
to benefit public employees. The
Carroll County court balanced the
competing considerations of open
meetings and collective bargaining in
favor of open meetings; whereas, most
commentators, courts and labor boards
favor collective bargaining, which they
consider to be more conducive to
industrial peace and increased indus~
trial productivity. 14
Critics of the Carroll County rationale
point out that open meetings suppress
free and open discussion, cause pro~
ceedings to become formalized rather
than spontaneous, induce rigidity and
posturing, create the false impression
that compromise is a form of retreat
and, therefore, freeze negotiators into
fixed positions from which they cannot
recede. ls Judge Davidson, who wrote
the dissenting opinion in Carroll County,
agrees that open meetings destroy the
effectiveness of the collective bargain~
ing process. 16
Even though open meetings are con~

sidered inconsistent with collective bar~
gaining, nearly half of the states (includ~
ing Maryland) that have both open
meeting laws and collective bargaining
statutes limit the public's participation
in public sector labor negotiations. 17
Citizens may attend open meetings but
may not particiapte in them; though the
public may view the negotiations,18 its
input is limited to expressing its views
before and after, but not during meet~
ings. This limited participation balances
the harshness of the open meeting
requirement.

The End Result
The effects of open meetings on col~
lective bargaining in Maryland will
probably be similar to those noted by a
Florida survey that analyzed the first
two years of Florida's open bargaining
experiment. 19 One negative aspect of
open bargaining noted by the survey
was that the participants played to the
audience. In addition, the normal ad~
versarial relationship between unions
and management became even more po~
larised,zo As bargaining positions
hardened, negotiations took longer, and
the cost of bargaining increased. The
survey, however, also noted some posi~
tive aspects of open meetings: union re~
presentatives tempered their demands
and the public had a chance to express
its views and prepare itself in advance
for proposed reductions in public
services. 21
Carroll County may have political
consequences affecting employer / em~
ployee relations. Labor unions strongly
oppose open bargaining, which they
view as a management device to rally
the public's support against union de~
mands. 22 There has been very little
strike activity in Maryland's public sec~
tor; however, Maryland public sector
unions may view Carroll County as a
threat to their bargaining power and
may feel compelled to resort to illegal
strikes. Thus, Carroll County may re~
present a step backwards by fostering
antagonism between unions and man~
agement which may result in more
strike activity.
Carroll County represents a rational
assessment of competing views. The
decision fairly balances the interests of
unionized public employees with the
public's interest in open government.
Although the impact of Carroll County
may not be felt for some time, it
relPresents a significant step in the
refinement of a discrete body of public
sector labor law.
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already mastered the skills that they are
trying to impart and are familiar with
the conventions of the profession. They
know that putting legal skills into
action can do a lot of harm. They have
seen legal arguments intensify and even
initiate disagreements rather than re~
solve them; they have seen students
who-having just learned to say "inter
alia" or divide their arguments into
three numbered sections (and even
perhaps remember the third part of the
argument )-feel that because of these
skills they have somehow become
superior to other citizens; they have
seen first~year law students disdain the
"fuzzy" thinking of other citizens and
even of their spouses and friends, so
that they exhibit an aggresive over~
confidence that is sometimes never
outgrown; they are well aware of judges
who think that some special skill
entitles them to a superior place in the
resolution of social problems. Teachers
may love their craft and the skills of
their profession, but they are at least as
aware of the limitations as anyone else.
They spend a great deal of their
academic effort questioning basic as~
sumptions about how law is used, at
attempting to locate the limitations of
law. They want students to master the
techniques and then to transcend them.
Sooner or later (and this mispercep~
tion tends to last indefinitely) many
students come to believe that their
teachers know nothing, are not there at
all. The most common version of this
belief is that teachers are not interested
in practical things. Put bluntly, students
adopt this attitude because their teachers
insist that they continue thinking about
problems when they are tired of them.
Students and alumni criticize teachers
as "too abstract," "too impractical,"
"too academic," but these are merely
euphemisms for exasperation. Most law
teachers have practiced law, many still
do, and some will go back to the
practice full time. Of course, the
faculty's academic interests may differ
from the students' interests from time
to time, but there is no real doubt that
the skills being taught are generally the
skills needed in practice. Law students
are taught to be precise, to develop the
capacity to forsee potential weaknesses
in their own arguments, to be orderly,
to be complete, to be imaginative in the
construction of legal arguments. These
are the intellectual skills that the
practice of law requires.
Another version of the belief that the
teacher knows nothing is the distres~

singly common view that law teachers
are trying to convince their students
that there are always two sides to every
argument. Many law students believe
they have seen deeply into the purposes
of legal education when they conclude
that anyone argument is as good as any
other, that the important thing is just to
be able to come up with an argument.
Students might come to this conclusion
because teachers tend to raise additional
questions in response to most answers.
The perceived message is that the
student is to learn to make an
argument, any argument; one must be
as good as another since there are
problems with all arguments. This
perception is almost completely wrong.
Teachers, of course, question answers
so that students will learn to discover
possible weaknesses in even their
strongest arguments. Moreover, most
teachers want students to be able to
judge quality for themselves. They do
not make a habit of telling students
when their answers are "right" because
a lawyer must learn to judge indepen~
dently, by his own standards, when an
argument is good enough. The point of
all those questions is, in fact, to show
students how to judge quality in
argument, not to urge the view that
quality is irrelevant.
I do not mean these observations to
be self~serving. There is some truth in
all the misperceptions that I have
described. Every faculty member has
many weaknesses, as does legal educa~
tion in general. But the misperceptions
distort-even oppose-what I think
most law teachers know to be true. In
this way they illustrate how powerful is
the urge that students feel to diminish
their teachers. Legal education is still
fairly rigorous, and it involves many
real frustrations and disappointments.
Only some of these are caused by
faculty members. To caricature and
ultimately to try to eliminate the
teacher that stands in front of them is a
way for students to make the teacher
responsible for all the difficulties
associated with becoming educated in
law. Law students in this regard only
share (and perhaps enlarge) the near
universal desire of students to avoid
taking responsibility for their own
education. Sadly, like any group subject
to fairly constant misperception,
teachers are under pressure to in~
ternalize the distorted image of them~
selves reflected in their students' eyes.
Much of the malaise in legal education
today may be as much a consequence of

the resulting personal unhappiness as it
is of any real ineffectiveness inherent in
prevalent teaching techniques.
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